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Greenwood Press 1991. Pp. 218.
A welcome contribution to the literature of state constitutional
law, this rather slender volume explores what the author describes
as the "New Federalism," a concerted effort by state appellate
courts to modify the alleged growing conservatism of the Supreme
Court in criminal case review.' Much of the text compares the Warren Court liberalism with the Burger-Rehnquist Court tilt toward
conservatism. By liberalism, the author means a distinct emphasis
on defendant rights, using every conceivable constitutional means;
by conservatism, he refers to a reverse judicial penchant apparently
favoring the police and prosecution.
Latzer correctly points out that the Warren Court (1953-1969)
interpreted the "four key criminal justice Bill of Rights provisions
'2
...more favorably to the accused,"
and also subsumed them more
quickly into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
than previous high courts.3 Conversely, he claims that the BurgerRehnquist Court (1970-present) began to narrowly interpret de* Professor, Department ofJustice Studies, Northern Michigan University.
1 BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1991). "This state
constitutional law renaissance is known variously as the new (judicial) federalism, the
state law movement or, more extravagantly, the state constitutional revolution." Id. at I.

Justice William Brennan also described this concept as "[r]ediscovery by state supreme
courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions
...is probably the most important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our
times." The Fourteenth Amendment, Address to the Section on Individual Rights and
Responsibilities of the American Bar Association (Aug. 8, 1986), in NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29,
1986, (Special Supplement) at S-I.
2 LATZER, supra note I, at 3. Specifically, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments all deal with a defendant's rights under the criminal justice system.
3 Id.
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fendants' rights in criminal cases, precipitating state court reactions.
The states realized at this time that "although they could not reduce
the rights mandated by due process, the state courts were free to
expand as a matter of state law. ' 4 This, then, is the essence of the
"New Federalism" expounded by Latzer: while the Supreme Court
has unquestioned jurisdiction over federal constitutional interpretations, it does not have jurisdiction over the interpretations of state
constitutions. 5

FormerJustice Brennan is cited as the champion of criminal defendants' rights, as well as a progenitor and early defender of the
"New Federalism." This poses some interesting comparisons in
legal and constitutional syntax. Traditionally, scholars view federalism as the balance between state and federal authority as originally
envisaged in Articles I and III of the Constitution, 6 certainly within
the Tenth Amendment 7 and also within the Supremacy Clause,
which mandates state court acceptance of federal constitutional issues.8 But the interesting double helix is that this "New Federalism," rather than manifesting the old states' rights opposition to
centralized judicial authority, actually surpasses Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, and their Fourteenth Amendment crusade to
grant more latitude to defendants in criminal trials.
Latzer uses two measuring stratagems to test his thesis that in
order to protect criminal defendants, state constitutional amendments expand Fourteenth Amendment interpretations more than
the federal judicial system. The initial strategy uses a case-by-case
comparison of legal issues, such as search and seizure, Miranda
rights and self-incrimination, right to counsel, adverse witness confrontation, cruel and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy.
4 Id. This, however, can be considered moot. If the states are bound to heed the
Supreme Court decisions only on federal law, the U.S. Constitution and treaties, but not
when interpreting their own state law, what prevents the Court from interpreting state
statutes as violations of federal law? Judicial decisions follow application and interpretation, as well as fact. Supreme Court negative review can include state statutes.
5 Id. at 5. The Supreme Court would have jurisdiction over state constitutions only
if they were to interpret them in violation of the federal constitution.
6 Article I grants Congress the "necessary and proper" authority for exercising enumerated powers, but it was the Supreme Court that spelled this out in the implied powers doctrine in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819);
McCollough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) et aL Article III did not expressly endow the Supreme Court with judicial review powers, but it was so interpreted
by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
8 " ... Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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The second strategy utilizes a quantitative comparison of all fifty
state supreme courts with the Supreme Court in criminal case
jurisprudence. 9
Looking initially at case law comparisons, the author has compiled post-briefs on a large number of cases reflecting these federal
constitutional issues. Starting with the now venerable Mapp v.
Ohio,' 0 in which the Warren Court imposed the exclusionary rule
regarding illegally obtained evidence on state criminal cases, Latzer
demonstrates how the Burger-Rehnquist Court has consistently narrowed the Mapp protection, through such cases as United States v.
Calandra.Il In this case, the Supreme Court held the Mapp protection inapplicable to proceedings other than the trial and restricted
Fourth Amendment habeas corpus review. In other words, the
Court downgraded the philosophical intent of the exclusionary rule
to a mere "judicially created remedy."' 2 But if the United States
Supreme Court was attempting to assist police and prosecutors by
gradually desiccating the exclusionary rule without actually overturning it, Latzer cites ample evidence that many state supreme
courts simply were not buying it. Hence, the states created a "New
Federalism" in criminal law, which was also championed consistently by United States Supreme Court Justices Brennan and
Marshall.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, for example, in Turner v. City of
Lawton, 13 ruled against the Burger Court's reasoning in United States
v. Janis 14 that under the exclusionary rule, drugs found in an unlawful search were inadmissible for use in a disciplinary administrative
personnel hearing. The Oklahoma court ruled that exclusion is a
fundamental right under the Oklahoma Constitution, and not just a
rule of judicial procedure. In doing so, the court followed the lead
9

LATZER,

supra note 1, at ch. 8.

Id. at 3, 33. See also 367 U.S. 643 (1961). An excellent brief discussion of the
gradual application of the exclusionary rule to the states is found in MARTIN SHAPIRO &
Rocco J. TRESOLINI, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 631-33 (6th ed. 1983).
11 414 U.S. 338 (1974). LATZER, supra note 1, at 33-34.
10

12 LATZER, supra note 1, at 34. The exclusionary rule derives from the Fourth

Amendment prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures," which the Warren Court expanded in such cases as Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (ruling
against warrantless searches of a home), and Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948) (ruling against warrantless searches of other property, in this case, an alcohol
still). Eloquently dissenting in the Court's limiting of the exclusionary rule in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), Justice Frankfurter said, "the test of reason
which makes searches reasonable . . . [is] underlying and expressed by the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 83.
13 733 P.2d 375 (Okla. 1987). LATZER, supra note 1, at 46 n.19.
14 428 U.S. 433 (1976). LATZER, supra note I,at 35.
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of the Oregon Supreme Court which strongly asserted the right of
the defendant to invoke the exclusionary rule from the Fourth
Amendment.' 5 Latzer correctly points out that Oregon followed
Weeks v. United States, 16 which was the first case to mandate that evidence illegally obtained in a criminal case may not be used against
the defendant by virtue of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule. 17 But the dictum in that case pertained only to the person, not
to a warrantless search of property.' 8
Other states, including Massachusetts and Connecticut, have
joined this "New Federalism" extension of the exclusionary rule to
prevent Mapp rights from being reduced. The Connecticut
Supreme Court even invoked the increasingly rare legal concept of
desuetude (loss of precedent through disuse) to support exclusionary
protection.19
Other states are more conservative, however, preferring the socalled inclusionary rule, which allows state judges to admit certain
kinds of illegally obtained evidence. California and Florida use inclusionary rules, and Michigan goes so far as to refuse to exclude
any evidence in criminal cases involving bombs, drugs, or weapons,
20
no matter how obtained.
Apart from the multitudinous Mapp spin-offs, especially the poetic legalism known as "the fruit of the poisoned tree," 2 1 as extensions of the exclusionary rule, this small but heavily compact volume
is well-researched in other areas of state constitutionalism and criminaljustice. These include private searches (normally not subject to
warrants nor Miranda), and the concept of "automatic standing" for
15 LATZER, supra note 1,
16 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

at 35.

17 LATZER, supra note 1, at 33, 46 n.16, 17.
18 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755 (1969) (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at

392).
19 LATZER, supra note 1, at 37. See also State v. Dukes, 547 A.2d 10 (Conn. 1988), and
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE

BAR OF POLITICS 148-56 (2d ed. 1986), for an excellent historical analysis of desuetude in

British and American law.
20 "California's Proposition 8, adopted June 8, 1982, placed in that state's constitution an inclusionary rule broader than Michigan's ...prohibiting exclusion of any 'relevant evidence,' even if seized in violation of the state charter." LATZER, supra note 1, at
37. See also People v. Moore, 216 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. 1974).
21 The "poison tree" doctrine dates back to 1920, but with such exceptions as infor-

mation from sources independent of the illegal search. The Burger-Rehnquist Court
expanded the exceptions. LATZER, supra note 1, at 38-39. "The colorfully named fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine is an extension of the exclusionary rule to evidence derived
from other, illegally obtained evidence." Id.
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evidence suppression. 22 Search and seizure problems are further illuminated in such diverse examples as electronic surveillance, bank
automobile
and phone records, overflights, bodily intrusions,
23
problems.
warrant
specialized
searches, and various
Latzer criticized the Burger-Rehnquist Court's New York v. Bel2
4
ton decision as another conservative trend, and "hardly a ringing
endorsement of the Burger Court's efforts," 2 5 since no less than
eleven states reject the idea. 26 He states further that the2 7Belton case
has caused the most significant rift among state courts.
Continuing what he observes as an exacerbating gap between
the state and federal courts over exclusionary rule interpretations,
Latzer also makes heavy use of Miranda as a landmark in defendant
rights, which the current Supreme Court has weakened. 28 Three select cases illustrate his claim: Harris v. New York, 2 9 in which Miranda
0
rights were ignored to admit impeachment of a defendant;3 New
York v. Quarles,3 1 in which the Court placed public safety over the
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination protection;3 2 and Oregon v. Elstad,33 in which a failure to administer Miranda rights before a suspect's initial statement did not prejudice subsequent warned
34 Latzer has
statements, provided the first statement was voluntary.
documented a potentially serious problem here in demonstrating
the extent to which the Burger-Rehnquist Court has experimented
persistent whittling down of
with the "poison tree" violations in 3its
5
cases.
defendants' rights in criminal
22 LATZER, supra note 1, at 40. Automatic standing is granted to "persons legitimately on the premises." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
23 LATZER, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
24 453 U.S. 454 (1981). In this case, the Court allowed police to search the passenger
compartment of an automobile, but not the trunk.

25 LATZER, supra note 1, at 71.
26 Id.

27 Id. Furthermore, the author declares that the "Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment rulings have been so numerous and so controversial that they have served as virtual lightning rods for state court divergence ...

the Burger-Rehnquist Court has made

significant incursions into defendants' Fourth Amendment rights---especially in such
matters as the exclusion of evidence, standing, automobile searches, the validity of warrants, and searches incident to arrest." Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
28 Compare LATZER, supra note 1, at 89 ("The Burger Court weakened but did not
overturn Miranda.") with SHAPIRO & TRESOLINI, supra note 10, at 649 ("The Burger
Court has very seriously reduced the scope of Miranda.") (emphasis added).

29 401 U.S. 222 (1971).

30 LATZER, supra note 1, at 89.

31 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
32 LATZER, supra note 1, at 90.

33 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
34

LATZER, supra note 1, at 90.

35 "Fruit" metaphors abound in the law. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 669-70 (6th
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In gathering his artillery against the Burger-Rehnquist Court,
the author summons up heavy reserves of legal ammunition from
various state supreme courts on the Miranda issue. For example,
when the current Court ruled in Moran v. Burbine3 6 that the police
are not required to inform a suspect in custody that a thirdparty has
retained counsel on his behalf, six states promptly opposed it, specifically California, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, New York, and
Oklahoma.3 7 In People v. Houston,3 8 the California court ruled that a
defendant must be'informed if an attorney retained by his friends
arrives at the police station;3 9 the other five states ruled in similar, if
40
slightly different, scenarios.
Latzer also has compiled concise but highly informative chapters on the Eighth Amendment 4 ' vis-a-vis the death penalty, and the
Fifth Amendment's limitations on doublejeopardy. 4 2 A legal as well
as a semantic conundrum for scholars has always been the question
of "cruel and unusual" or "cruel or unusual." A conjunction or correlative can make a big difference in the criminal law. What of the
normal meaning of words? 43 Obviously the Eighth Amendment forbids cruel and unusual punishment, but does this allow executions
that are cruel but not unusual? .The late Justice Clark was fond of
saying that the death penalty would be clearly unconstitutional had
there not been that ubiquitous conjunction.
The Burger-Rehnquist Court has upheld the death penalty,
however, and most state supreme courts have, in the author's words,
"brushed aside arguments relying on phraseology." 4 4 The California State Court has found its own state death penalty provision used. 1990). LATZER, supra note 1, at 90 ("Miranda can still be the poisoned fruit" ifnot
administeredproperly.) (emphasis added).
36 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
37 LATZER,
38

supra note 1, at 92.

724 P.2d 1166 (Cal. 1986).

39 LATZER,

supra note 1, at 105.

Latzer cites State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446 (Conn. 1988) (must inform defendant
of efforts by counsel to suppress confession if assertion of right against self-incrimination would have been reasonably likely); Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla.
1987) (family retained counsel); State v. Welch, 337 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1976) (police must
honor father's request for counsel); People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537 (N.Y. 1968) (attorney went to police station due to television news report); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528
(Okla. Grim. App. 1984) (parents retained counsel). See LATZER, supra note 1,at 105
n.32.
41 LATZER, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
42 Id. at ch. 7.
43 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). In Justice Day's opinion in this
case, "Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to be used
in their ordinary and usual sense." Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
44 LATZER, supra note 1, at 135. Where the U.S. Constitution uses "and," 21 state
constitutions use the word "or." Id. at 139 n.28, 205-06.
40
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ing "or" to be highly significant, 45 but if there really exists "New
Federalism," the sobering fact remains that most states have not vo46
ciferously opposed federal doctrine on this issue.
The question of whether a truly strong case can be made for the
"New Federalism" in criminal law is moot because jurisprudential
interpretations between the states and the federal government remain mixed. In some areas, such as the exclusionary rule, the states
seem to be more liberal than the Supreme Court, and in others,
such as the death penalty, the states are more conservative; but the
thesis remains interesting and deserves more attention by scholars
in constitutional law.
Latzer has summed up the impact of "New Federalism," not
only through exhaustive case law review, but also by means of a
quantitative measuring tool he devised. 4 7 To assess the impact of
state-federal disagreement, he tabulated rejections and adoptions of
U.S. Supreme Court reasoning in criminal procedure cases by state
supreme courts on grounds of state constitutional law. His database
assumed that a seventy-five percent agreement or disagreement
warranted a conclusion of conformity with, or opposition to, the
48
Supreme Court rulings in criminal case procedures.
Following those guidelines, the ten most active, hence liberal,
states, which relied on their own state constitutions as opposed to
Supreme Court rulings, were: California, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Florida, Pennsylvania, Montana, West Virginia, Connecticut, Alaska,
and New Jersey. 49 The ten least active, hence conservative, states
within this "New Federalism" movement were: South Carolina, Arkansas, Nevada, Alabama, Indiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, Virginia, Georgia, and North Dakota. 50 There is also a table based
upon the broader continuum of all fifty states, and the degree to
which they rejected or adopted given Supreme Court procedural
maxims by percentages.5 1
45 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). It is significant because the death
penalty is both cruel and unusual; the former because of painful death, the latter because
it is rarely carried out.
46 LATZER, supra note 1, at 137.
47 Id. at 160-64.
48 Id. at ch. 8.
49 Id. at 162, tbl. 2.
50 Id. at 162, tbl. 3.
51 Id. at 164, tbl. 4. The legal contests between the several states and the national
government are as old as the Union itself, whether in criminal or civil law. One of the
best known is Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Others include Pensacola
Telegraph v. Western Union Telegraph, 96 U.S. 1 (1878), Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918), and NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). In
criminal law, the actus reus, or prohibited conduct, can and does vary in degree, interpre-
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The "New Federalism" can be an ambiguous political-legal
phenomenon, and Latzer admits this, but his book is important for
all judges, attorneys and constitutional scholars, not only for its
message, but for its implications. For much of our national history,
for example, there has existed what might be termed a "Jeffersonian
apprehension" 52 over a national Supreme Court, which has extended judicial activism at times to the perceived usurpation of legislative prerogatives, both state and federal. The ancient maxim,
"Jus Dicere et non Jus Dare,"5 3 comes to mind.
The author implies new movement in the increasingly legal ambiguity of criminal law jurisprudence between state and federal
courts, but there is a positive legal and constitutional antidote. He
correctly points out that there exists both vertical and horizontal
legal threads in the national web of criminal law, which tend to modify each other. The vertical pressure exerted is from the Supreme
Court to state courts to adopt the federal positions, 54 and the horizontal counterpoint comes from the sheer volume of state cases. In
a given year, especially during the current decade, the fifty "state
supreme courts render thousands of decisions while the one U.S.
Supreme Court resolves fewer than three hundred ....Thus, vertitation, and punishment from state to state. Fifty states have fifty distinct criminal justice
systems. Add to this the federal codes, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the traditions of common law, and two centuries of American precedent, and the explanation for
state/federal variances becomes clear. Indeed, there is no single unified United States
criminal justice system.
52 One of the fundamental arguments of the Constitutional Convention was the extent of federal judicial power. Delegates such as John Rutledge and Luther Martin specifically opposed judicial review, and while the Framers discussed this concept, they did
not include it in Article III. The power was assumed in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803), by the brilliant reverse logic of ChiefJustice John Marshall during
Thomas Jefferson's first administration. Jefferson's response was immediate and vociferous in his insistence that negative review would, in effect, give the Supreme Court veto
power over the Congress, fatally weakening Article I and the legislative prerogatives. A
stunned Jefferson called Marshall that "crafty chief judge" and claimed that with the
Marbuy decision, the Supreme Court had made of the Constitution " . . . a thing of
wax," which could be shaped to the Court's will. See SAUL PADOVER, JEFFERSON: A
GREAT AMERICAN'S LIFE AND IDEAS (1952) and ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAN LAW (1960). Dean Pound wrote, "The American Colonial Republic was hostile to all things English ... the whole idea of professions like law, was repugnant to the
mass egalitarianism of the Jeffersonian era." POUND, supra at 7. The Jeffersonian dis-

taste for national judges making policy also stemmed from the fight against British
Crown Judges vetoing legislation by the Virginia House of Burgesses prior to the
Revolution. The Tenth Amendment also later reflected the insistence upon states'
rights against intrusive federal authority. This amendment may indeed be resurfacing in
Latzer's "New Federalism" thesis if his premise is correct, but hopefully, in a positive,
rational, and democratic manner.
53 "To declare the law, not to make it." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 859 (6th ed. 1990).
54 LATZER, supra note 1, at 167.

692

KURT VON S. KYNELL

[Vol. 83

cal federalism's most potent weapon-Supreme Court review-is

55
limited by the vastness of the state court output."
The criminal justice system thereby remains viable, even as the
thrust of the "New Federalism" is developing. The liaisons between
state and federal courts continue, including ongoing debates over
constitutional issues, an elaboration which this volume provides. It
is a balanced analysis that offers hope for the individual states within
the possible increasing centralism of federal jurisprudence. Perhaps
a corollary study is also needed of the relationships between state
courts and the federal district courts. Latzer points out that few
books exist on "New Federalism"; the majority of work on this issue
is published in law journals. As such, this study is a definitive step
forward and constitutes an excellent reference for graduate research
in both political science and law. The six appendices and specialized bibliography are also especially helpful for a condensed overview of sources on "New Federalism."

55 Id. at 168 (emphasis added).

